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Countermeasures are an established and instrumental aspect of the 
international legal system of self-help. Although countermeasures are of long 
lineage, it was only with the advent of cyber operations that they took center stage 
in international law discourse among states, as they appeared to offer injured states 
a legal basis for “hack backs.” This article examines the evolution of approaches to 
collective countermeasures initiated between states and reflected in the work of the 
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission. Upon this 
groundwork, we survey and assess the international security conditions relevant to 
the issue of collective countermeasures, with particular emphasis on their use in 
cyberspace. We conclude that, though the issue remains unsettled as a matter of 
law, collective cyber countermeasures on behalf of injured states, and support for 
the countermeasures of the injured state, are lawful.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 In May 2019, during remarks at the annual International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid offered her government’s 
views on a number of key international legal questions relating to cyberspace.1 
Expressing concern at the growing frequency of malicious cyber operations, she 
announced the following: 
 
Estonia is furthering the position that states which are not directly 
injured may apply countermeasures to support the state directly 
affected by the malicious cyber operation. The countermeasures 
applied should follow the principle of proportionality and other 
principles established within the international customary law. . . . It 
is therefore important that states may respond collectively to 
unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is insufficient, 
but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. Allies matter also in 
cyberspace.2 
 
 Delivered by a vibrant liberal democracy’s head of state and an enthusiastic 
supporter of international law, the Estonian position on collective countermeasures 
should be taken seriously and at face value. The position bears evidence of careful, 
if somewhat veiled, deliberation. Such public pronouncements on international law 
by law-abiding states are not made lightly.  
 
 Yet, soon after President Kaljulaid’s remarks, the French Armed Forces 
Ministry published a document summarizing its views on how international law 
governs cyberspace.3 Like President Kaljulaid’s speech, it highlighted growing 
security threats in cyberspace from both state and non-state actors.4 However, the 
Ministry expressly rejected the option of collective countermeasures as a lawful 
response to breaches of international law.5 Rather, it asserted, “Collective counter-
measures are not authorised, which rules out the possibility of France taking such 
measures in response to an infringement of another State’s rights.”6 
 
1 See Michael N. Schmitt, Estonia Speaks Out on Key Rules for Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (June 
10, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/ 
[https://perma.cc/LJ2R-8BYG]. 
2 Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia, Opening at CyCon 2019 (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-at-the-
opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html [https://perma.cc/9F9M-EUYG].  
3 See FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO OPERATIONS IN 
CYBERSPACE (2019), 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+t
o+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJQ3-XBWT]; see also Michael N. Schmitt, 
France’s Major Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 
16, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66194/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-
cyber-an-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/K29P-NKXL].  
4 See generally FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 3. 
5 See id. ¶ 1.1.3. 
6 Id. 
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 States like New Zealand lie between these two positions, dealing cautiously 
and non-committedly with the matter in announcing: 
 
Given the collective interest in the observance of international law 
in cyberspace, and the potential asymmetry between malicious and 
victim states, New Zealand is open to the proposition that victim 
states, in limited circumstances, may request assistance from other 
states in applying proportionate countermeasures to induce 
compliance by the state acting in breach of international law.7 
 
 Countermeasures are an established and instrumental aspect of the 
international legal system of self-help. They comprise non-forcible, but otherwise 
unlawful, acts undertaken in response to another state’s breach of an international 
law obligation.8 Available to induce the offending state (the “responsible state”) to 
desist in its unlawful conduct and/or provide any reparations that may be due the 
victim state (the “injured state”),9 a countermeasure is grounded in circumstances 
of “precluding wrongfulness” of a state’s actions under the law of state 
responsibility.10  
 
 Although the idea of countermeasures has long been a part of international 
law’s system of self-regulation,11 the potential for their abuse and the risk that they 
might incite escalatory cycles of retaliation have resulted in strict limits found in 
the law of state responsibility, some of which are legally ambiguous.12  The 
question whether the right to engage in countermeasures is strictly limited to injured 
states remains a key controversy. By one view, which we label the “bilateral” 
approach, an injured state may not enlist non-injured states to undertake “collective 
countermeasures,” that is, countermeasures engaged in on behalf of the injured 
state. Under this approach, non-injured states also may not offer or intervene with 
countermeasures on their own accord against the responsible state. France advances 
this legal position. 
 
 The shortcomings of the bilateral approach are apparent. The lack of 
collective responses to international law breaches would render self-help through 
 
7 NEW ZEALAND, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. AND TRADE, THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TO STATE ACTIVITY IN CYBERSPACE, ¶ 22 (2020), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-
resources/ministry-statements-and-speeches/cyber-il/ [perma.cc/H7HZ-ULML]. 
8 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with Commentaries, reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2 art. 49(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. 
9 See id. art. 22(1). 
10 See id. Other conditions precluding wrongfulness include consent, self-defense, necessity, force 
majeure, and distress. Id. pt. 1, ch. V. 
11 See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (8th ed. 
2012) (characterizing availability of countermeasures as an important distinction between domestic 
legal systems and the international law). 
12 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, pt. 3, ch. II (outlining proposed limits on states’ 
resort to countermeasures including conditions precedent). 
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countermeasures impossible for many weak states. If forced to respond alone, they 
would not be able to induce more powerful responsible states to cease unlawful 
activity. The Estonian case is paradigmatic. As a small NATO member lying on the 
border of a hostile Russia, it relies on its allies for security. This dependency is not 
only true with respect to a potential armed attack triggering Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty,13 but also vis-a-vis “below the threshold” unlawful activity, 
including in cyberspace.14 This situation leads to the Estonian position, which we 
shall label the “collectivist” approach, by which a non-injured state may assist an 
injured state to take countermeasures or engage in countermeasures on its behalf.  
 
 These differing perspectives on collective countermeasures reflect 
competing conceptions of international law—one that sees this body of law as 
primarily bilateral in character, the other as a normative system relying heavily on 
collective and cooperative means of self-help. Through the early twentieth century, 
internationally wrongful conduct was conceived chiefly as a bilateral matter, that 
is, exclusively between responsible and injured states.15 That conception would be 
challenged in the second half of the century as support emerged for a collectivist 
vision of international law meant to both enhance the prospect of enforcement and 
better bind the international community together.16  
 
 The collectivist conception holds that certain international norms, like the 
prohibition on genocide, are owed to the international community as a whole, or 
erga omnes.17 In case of breach, injured states include not only those that were 
directly injured, but also the international community, collectively and severally.18 
International law also began to feature codified collective enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s authority to 
authorize or mandate action, including the use of force, under Chapter VII of the 
1945 UN Charter19 and the right of collective self-defense in Article 51 of that 
instrument.20  
 
 Views admitting collective countermeasures soon surfaced in other contexts 
as well. In 1953, the UN General Assembly requested that the UN-sponsored 
 
13 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.  
14 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The 
Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2013).  
15 See DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 467–⁠68 (Gilbert Gidel trans., Recueil 
Sirey, 1947) (1929); Martti Koskenniemi, Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New 
International Order?, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 337, 339–340 (2001) (observing until the middle of 
the 1980s, countermeasures “remained in the bilateralist framework of traditional law . . . .”). 
16 See CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, UN: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 22-31 (1955) (describing post-Second 
World War collective security legal measures undertaken through United Nations auspices).  
17 See generally Jochen A. Frowein, Obligations Erga Omnes, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018). 
18 See INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, FIFTH COMM’N RESOLUTION, OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS 
ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 27, 2005), https://www.idi-
iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2005kra01en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F47-TR4U]. 
19 U.N. Charter ch. VII. 
20 Id. art. 51. 
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International Law Commission (ILC) codify the “principles of international law 
governing State responsibility.”21 Despite concerns that the availability of 
collective countermeasures might undermine the UN system,22 the ILC, as 
discussed infra, identified no prohibition on a collectivist remedial regime 
including countermeasures.23 After all, the UN system itself illustrates the authority 
of states to address breaches collectively; states drew from the same well of 
sovereign authority to create a system that, from the collectivist view, can also serve 
as a basis for collective measures lying outside the UN Charter.  
 
 As explained infra, although countermeasures have roots in history, the 
advent of cyber operations brought them to center stage in international law 
discourse among states, for they appeared to offer a legal basis for “hack backs” by 
injured states.24 Indeed, every state has confirmed the specific right to resort to 
countermeasures in the cyber context, though they sometimes disagree on the 
precise parameters governing them.25 This stance accords with the International 
 
21 G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953). 
22 See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/513, at 33 (2001) (relating states’ concerns that collective countermeasures would conflict 
with the authority of the United Nations under UN Charter Articles 39 to 41). 
23 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, arts. 42, 48, 54. 
24 See generally Schmitt, supra note 14. 
25 See e.g., Applicability of International Law to Conflicts in Cyberspace, in DIGEST OF U.S. PRAC. 
IN INT’L L. 732, 738–39 (2014); FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 3, ¶ 1.1.3; JEREMY 
WRIGHT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U.K., ADDRESS AT CHATHAM HOUSE, CYBER AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/cyber-
and-international-law-21st-century [https://perma.cc/ED6C-NFWE]; NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFS., LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER IN 
CYBERSPACE, APPENDIX: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE 7 (2019); Michael N. Schmitt, The 
Netherlands Releases a Tour de Force on International Law in Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 
14, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66562/the-netherlands-releases-a-tour-de-force-on-
international-law-in-cyberspace-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/9VXS-TRVQ]; AUSTRALIA, DEP’T. OF 
FOREIGN AFFS. AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: 
ANNEX A (2017), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-
engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html [https://perma.cc/AX57-XMZ6]; NEW ZEALAND, 
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. AND TRADE, supra note 7, ¶ 21; FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE: FINLAND’S NATIONAL POSITIONS 5–6 (2020), 
https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/KyberkannatPDFEN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-
07d5af3c6d85?t=1603097522727 [https://perma.cc/2C34-PZ6S]; Roy Schondorf, Israel’s 
Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to 
Cyber Operations, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/israels-perspective-on-
key-legal-and-practical-issues-concerning-the-application-of-international-law-to-cyber-
operations/ [https://perma.cc/WJR4-MM3W]; Michael N. Schmitt, Israel’s Cautious Perspective 
on International Law in Cyberspace: Part I (Methodology and General International Law), EJIL: 
TALK! (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/israels-cautious-perspective-on-international-law-
in-cyberspace-part-i-methodology-and-general-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/XB45-X3RQ]. 
Interestingly, the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts was unable to agree on 
mentioning a right to respond to internationally wrongful acts, a veiled reference to 
countermeasures. States that opposed inclusion of the reference did not indicate that opposition was 
based on the non-existence of a right to engage in countermeasures. Indeed, states in opposition also 
objected to including the terms self-defense and international humanitarian law, two legal regimes 
that obviously apply in the cyber context and that they had supported, albeit without use of the terms, 
in the 2015 GGE Report. See Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law 
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Court of Justice’s (ICJ) insistence that pre-existing international law rules govern 
nuclear weapons and likely other new technologies.26 However, on the narrower 
issue of collective countermeasures, neither the Estonian President’s remarks nor 
the French Ministry of the Armies document included, nor to date have they been 
followed by, supporting legal elaboration. In fact, the notion of collective 
countermeasures has never materialized into a coherent, universally agreed 
doctrine.  
 
 This Article examines the merits of the competing bilateral and collective 
positions, which we see as reflecting a broader tension between bilateralist and 
collectivist conceptions of international law. After introducing the notion of 
countermeasures generally, we examine the evolution of approaches to collective 
countermeasures, most of which is reflected in the work of the ICJ and the ILC. We 
then survey and assess the international security conditions relevant to the issue of 
collective countermeasures and emphasize their use in cyberspace. Finally, we 
conclude that the issue remains unsettled as a matter of law, but that the Estonian 
position is not only the more reasonable one but also the better of the two when 
applied to cyber operations. 
   
II. Countermeasures Generally 
 
 Originally termed reprisals, countermeasures have been a feature of 
international law for centuries. Indeed, the eighteenth-century legal publicist Emer 
de Vattel characterized reprisals as essential to the self-administered system of 
justice between states.27 In the past, sovereigns typically engaged in reprisals by 
seizing private foreign property to satisfy unpaid debts or breached contracts.28 
Over time, however, they shed much of their original restitutional or even 
 
Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-
cyber-norms/ [https://perma.cc/ABU2-GJ8Z]. 
26 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 39, 
86 (July 8); The International Law Commission has similarly noted that new technologies are 
subject to preexisting obligations, such as due diligence. Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the Gen. Assembly, art. 3 commentary ¶ 11, 
U.N. Doc A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 
COMM. 148, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (2001). In the cyber context, 
participants in the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group, which is open to all states, have agreed, 
“measures to promote responsible State behaviour should remain technology-neutral, underscoring 
that it is the misuse of such technologies, not the technologies themselves, that is of concern.” 
SECOND “PRE-DRAFT” OF THE REPORT OF THE OEWG ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF 
INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ¶ 21 
(2020), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/200527-oewg-ict-revised-pre-
draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/27CG-FXFN].  
27 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 460–⁠67 (§§ 342–⁠54) (Béla Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) [hereinafter DE VATTEL]. 
28 See id. at 460 (§342). 
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remunerative purpose and have evolved into a means of legal coercion intended to 
influence state conduct.29  
 
 By the early twentieth century, a widely agreed doctrinal definition of 
reprisal had emerged. In 1928, as part of the Versailles Treaty settlement of the 
First World War, a tribunal arbitrated a dispute concerning Germany’s resort to 
violent reprisals against Portuguese colonial fortresses in Africa in response to the 
murder of three German Army officers.30 The Naulilaa arbitral tribunal described 
reprisals as “an act of self-help (Selbsthilfhandlung) by an injured State, in response 
– after an unsuccessful demand – to an act contrary to international law by a 
wrongdoing State. It has the effect of temporarily suspending between the two 
States observation of one or other rules of international law.”31 That formulation 
held well into the mid-twentieth century and still informs much of what is 
understood about self-help under international law between states.32 
 
 As states began to acknowledge legal limits on their resort to force, a 
doctrinal distinction between peacetime and armed reprisals emerged, along with 
distinct terms for each practice.33 By 1980, both the ICJ and ILC adopted the term 
“countermeasure” to denote a peacetime response in the form of an otherwise 
unlawful act by states.34 While the term reprisal persisted, it was increasingly 
 
29 See EVELYN SPEYER COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1948) (identifying 
distinctly coercive purposes to public reprisals by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
30 Responsibility of Germany for Damage Caused in Portuguese Colonies of South Africa (Naulilaa 
Case) (Port. v. Ger.) 2 R.I.A.A. 1011 (1928) [hereinafter Naulilaa Arbitration]. See generally JAKOB 
ZOLLMAN, NAULILAA 1914: WORLD WAR I IN ANGOLA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) 
(analyzing archival records of historical context surrounding the Naulilaa arbitration). 
31 The tribunal’s original French reads, “[U]n acte de propre justice (Selbstilfehandlung) de l’État 
lésé, acte répondant – après sommation resté infructueuse – à un acte contraire au droit des gens de 
l’État offenseur. Elle a pour effet de suspendre momentanèment, dans les rapports des deux États, 
l’observations de telle ou tell règle du droit des gens.” Naulilaa Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1026. 
32 See Articles on State Responsibility supra note 8, ¶ 2. 
33 A 1934 report by the Institute of International Law identified, separate from armed reprisal, so-
called “non-armed retaliation.” See Institut de Droit International, R?́?gime des Respr?́?sailles en 
Temps de Paix, 38 ANNUAIRE INST. DROIT INT’L 708–⁠10 (1934); A 1957 report to the UN General 
Assembly on the law of treaties used the term “counter-action” in lieu of reprisal. Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 1957 ILC YEARBOOK Vol. II, at 53 (¶ 121); 
Later, an influential decision by a 1978 arbitral panel acknowledged that the United States, as an 
injured State, was entitled to resort to peacetime “counter-measures” to enforce its rights against 
France. Air Service Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443 ¶ 81 (1978); The 
term “sanction” had also been used but was eventually reserved for measures undertaken by 
international organizations rather than individual states. Denis Alland, The Definition of 
Countermeasures, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1127, 1134–⁠35 (James 
Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson eds., 2010). 
34 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgement, 1980 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 53 (May 24) (evaluating “counter-measures” taken by the United States against Iran); Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Thirty-First Session, Official Records of the Gen. Ass’y, Thirty-
Fourth Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/34/10, draft art. 30, at 115 (1979) (addressing 
“[c]ountermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act”). But see Willem Riphagen, Fifth 
Report on the Content, Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility, art. 9, in 1984 Y.B. INT’L 
L. COMM’N, Vol. II, pt. 1, 1, 3 (referring to “reprisal” rather than countermeasures). By 1984 
Elisabeth Zoller observed in her comprehensive study of countermeasures, “the word [reprisal] is 
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confined to situations of armed conflict.35 Use of the terms “belligerent reprisal” or 
“armed reprisal” further emphasized a distinction from peaceful countermeasures.36  
 
 In its 2001 final draft of the Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC 
included countermeasures among the conditions that preclude the wrongfulness of 
otherwise internationally unlawful acts by states.37 Yet the final Special Rapporteur 
of the ILC’s work on state responsibility, Professor James Crawford, described 
countermeasures as “perhaps the most difficult and controversial aspect of the 
whole regime of State responsibility.”38  
 
 As evidence of its considerable misgivings on the use of countermeasures, 
the ILC enumerated extensive conditions, procedural and substantive, on states’ 
resort to countermeasures.39  First, according to the ILC, an injured state may only 
take countermeasures against a responsible state, which is a state to whom 
internationally unlawful conduct is attributable.40 Under the Articles on State 
Responsibility, third-party states are not legitimate objects of countermeasures, nor 
may a countermeasure against a responsible state breach an obligation owed to 
those third-party states.41 Second, countermeasures must, as far as circumstances 
permit, involve temporary or reversible measures.42 Third, the ILC identified a host 
of inviolable obligations with respect to countermeasures.43 For example, they may 
not involve breaches of “peremptory norms of general international law,” nor select 
 
banned from the international legal vocabulary. One refers nowadays to ‘self-help measures of 
protection involving the use of force.’” ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: 
AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES 40 (1984). 
35 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 20, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting “reprisals” against protected persons). 
36 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 513–⁠29 (2005) (outlining limits and prohibitions on “belligerent reprisals”); 
see generally FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (2d ed. 2005).  
37 See Articles on State Responsibility supra note 8, art. 22. Other conditions precluding 
wrongfulness include consent, self-defense, necessity, force majeure, and distress. Id. pt.1, ch. V. 
38 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–⁠26 July 1996, Official 
Records of the Gen. Ass’y, Fifty-First Session, Supp. No. 10, 1996, in Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, Vol. 
II, pt. 2, at 66; see also Alain Pellet, The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts and Related Texts, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 75, 86 (James 
Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson & Kate Parlett, eds., 2010) (noting fierce discussions on 
countermeasures among states); David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 817, 817 (2002) (judging the ILC’s work on countermeasures to be “one of the lightning 
rods of criticism and controversy for the articles.”). 
39 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, arts. 49–54. 
40 See id. art. 49(1). Part I, Chapter II of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility set forth the bases 
for state attribution. Id. arts. 4–⁠11. 
41 See Michael N. Schmitt & M. Christopher Pitts, Cyber Countermeasures and Effects on Third 
Parties: The International Legal Regime, 14 BALTIC Y.B. OF INT’L L. 1, 6 (2014). 
42 See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 87 (Sept. 25); 
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 49(3). 
43 See id. art. 50. 
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provisions of the international law of diplomacy.44 Fourth, the ILC indicated that 
countermeasures must be proportionate to the wrong suffered.45 The ILC Articles 
assess proportionality by reference to “the gravity of the internationally wrongful 
act and the rights in question.”46 Finally, the Articles require an injured state to call 
upon the responsible state to honor its obligations (sommation), notify the 
responsible state of its intent to undertake countermeasures, and offer to negotiate 
before undertaking countermeasures.47  
 
 The extent to which the Articles on State Responsibility, including its 
provisions on countermeasures, reflect either customary international law or only 
progressive/aspirational development of the law remains unsettled.48 States have 
offered mixed reactions to the ILC’s limits on countermeasures. In 2001, for 
example, the United States submitted extensive comments to a late draft of the 
Articles.49 It characterized many of the procedural restraints on countermeasures as 
unsupported by state practice.50 Specifically, the United States contested the 
negotiation requirement, as well as passages limiting states to “provisional and 
urgent” countermeasures prior to and during negotiations.51 The United States also 
argued that the prohibition on breaches of peremptory norms was both unnecessary 
and intolerably vague,52 and it disputed the ILC’s formulation of proportionality as 
 
44 Id. art. 50. Article 50 specifically prohibits countermeasures involving the use or threat of force, 
violations of fundamental human rights, prohibited humanitarian reprisals, breaches of dispute 
settlement provisions, or violations of protected diplomatic agents, premises, and documents. Id. 
45 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Judgment, supra note 42, ¶¶ 85–⁠87. 
46 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 51. 
47 See id. art. 52. The commentary to Article 52 acknowledges that a victim state may take urgent 
countermeasures without notice when circumstances require. Id. art. 52(2). 
48 See, e.g., Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, General Commentary, at 31 (“These 
articles seek to formulate, by way of codification and progressive development, the basic rules of 
international law concerning the responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts.”). 
See also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 
79 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2d ed. 2017) (observing “International Group of Experts 
acknowledged that certain issues with respect to some Articles [of State Responsibility] remain 
unsettled and that not all States view them as an authoritative restatement of customary international 
law.”) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]; Hubert Lesaffre, Circumstances Precluding 
Wrongfulness in the ILC Articles on States Responsibility, in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, supra 
note 33, at 469-70 (evaluating the Articles’s provisions on countermeasures as “progressive 
development of the law, rather than mere codification of existing principles.”); Federica Paddeu, 
Countermeasures, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 10 (Sep. 2015), 
(citing Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, ¶ 381 (Aug. 13, 
2009)). 
49 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, COMMENTS OF 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (2001), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/28993.pdf [https://perma.cc/82SM-GZEF] [hereinafter 
Comments of U.S. Gov’t 2001]. 
50 See id. at 2. 
51 Id. at 5–⁠6. 
52 See id. at 2–⁠4. 
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misstated and unclear.53 Ultimately, the United States urged the ILC to delete the 
entire section on countermeasures restrictions.54  
 
 Other states have expressed similar misgivings. Japan asserted that the 
proportionality limit, as articulated by the ILC, would unduly prejudice weak states’ 
ability to influence the conduct of powerful states.55 Slovakia worried that the duty 
to suspend countermeasures during negotiations excessively hampered injured 
states.56 And the United Kingdom characterized the ILC’s conditions on 
negotiation as “so fundamentally flawed as to render the provisions on 
countermeasures, as currently drafted, wholly unacceptable.”57  
 
 Despite these concerns, there is legal common ground. Countermeasures are 
widely regarded as fundamental to, and even inherent in, the international legal 
system.58 They represent an essential distinction between vertical municipal 
regimes of enforcement and the horizontal international regime of self-help among 
sovereigns.59 In this respect, countermeasures are intrinsic to sovereignty.60 
Another defining feature of countermeasures is their resort to otherwise 
 
53 See id. at 3–⁠4. The United States argued that proportionality involved the kind and degree of 
measures required to induce a return to compliance rather than an evaluation of whether the breaches 
undertaken were commensurate or comparable in some sense to the initial breach of the offending 
state. Id. at 4. It contended that, “a degree of response greater than the precipitating wrong may 
sometimes be required to bring a wrongdoing state into compliance with its obligations . . . .” Id. 
(citing Air Service Agreement, supra note 33, at 443–⁠44). 
54 See Comments of U.S. Gov’t 2001, supra note 49, at 2. 
55 See Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 86, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/515 and 
Add. 1–3 (March 19, April 3, May 1, & June 28, 2001). 
56 See id. at 88. 
57 Id. at 88. 
58 See e.g., United Kingdom, id. at 84 (“It is clearly necessary to refer in general terms to the right 
to take countermeasures.”). The Government of Argentina expressed some reluctance at recognizing 
countermeasures as a right of States in the Articles. Id. at 82. Ultimately, however, Argentina 
concluded, “there is no doubt that, in the current state of international law, countermeasures 
represent one of the means of giving effect to international responsibility.” Id. Japan also expressed 
reluctance to recognize countermeasures as a secondary rule of responsibility but ultimately 
conceded, “in a world where there is no central supreme government over States, States are entitled 
to protect their interests by themselves and countermeasures are permitted under international law.” 
Id. at 83. The Government of Mexico, however, expressed regret at the ILC’s decision to “confer 
[sic] general international recognition on [countermeasures],” preferring they be left to serial 
treatment under specific regimes of international law. Id. at 83. 
59 See CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 585. 
60 Denis Alland characterizes them as “an institution of general international law” requiring no 
external conferral of authority. See Alland, supra note 33, at 1129; In this respect, countermeasures 
might be contrasted with the separate yet perhaps complementary remedial regime applicable to 
treaties. Whereas the law of treaties includes explicit and generally applicable rules in cases of 
breach, countermeasures have not involved similar positive conferrals of authority. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 
Countermeasures have been recognized as distinct from and complementary to the remedies for 
breach developed in the law of treaties. Difference Between New Zealand and France Concerning 
the Interpretation or Application of Two Agreements Concluded on 9 July 1986 between the Two 
States and Which Related to the Problems Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 
20 R.I.A.A. 215, 249–50 (Arb. Trib. 1990); Air Service Agreement, supra note 33, at 443. 
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internationally unlawful conduct.61 Accordingly, responses that do not constitute 
breaches of international law need not qualify as countermeasures and thus are not 
subject to the same limitations. Retorsions are an example of such responses; they 
involve merely unfriendly, as opposed to inherently unlawful, acts.62  
 
 Unlike negative reciprocity and suspension of treaty obligations, 
countermeasures need not involve breach of the precise obligation that occasions 
their use.63 An injured state may breach an unrelated legal obligation, so long as 
that breach is reasonably anticipated to end the unlawful conduct and/or secure any 
reparations that might be due. A further distinct and widely accepted aspect of 
countermeasures relates to their admitted purpose. While they often convey a 
punitive sentiment, countermeasures are instrumental. Injured states use them as 
tools to induce an offending state to return to compliance with the international 
obligation that gave rise to the countermeasure.64  
 
 In sum, countermeasures occupy a vital, albeit less than fully settled, place 
in international law. Through state practice, they have evolved from blunt tools of 
retaliation (in both practical and doctrinal senses) into a centerpiece of an 
international legal system of self-help that is focused on inducing lawful conduct. 
A significant body of doctrine purports to regulate how states use countermeasures. 
Nonetheless, questions persist concerning the precise contours of these limits, none 
more so than the extent to which countermeasures are properly conceived of as 
purely bilateral or rather collective tools of enforcement. 
 
III. Collective Countermeasures 
 
 Like the general doctrine of countermeasures, a settled doctrine for 
collective countermeasures has proved elusive and contentious.65 Two approaches 
have emerged. A somewhat traditional, bilateral regime of enforcement has sought 
 
61 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, arts. 22, 49(2). 
62 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 185 (1991); Thomas 
Giegerich, Retorsion, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (March 
2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e983 
[https://perma.cc/W4ZX-5RWW]. 
63 See 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 453 (1968) (contrasting negative and 
positive reciprocity); Francesco Paris & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 
36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93, 108 n.48 (citing Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: 
The Economics of Reciprocity 1 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 336, 2000), 
https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2000/working-paper/fairness-and-retaliation-economics-
reciprocity [https://perma.cc/6MWT-QV9A]. 
64 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 49(1). See also comments of the United 
Kingdom, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, supra note 55, at 55 
(“[C]ountermeasures must be . . . limited in their aim to inducing the responsible State to comply 
with its obligations.”); id. at 66 (“State responsibility is concerned with the redress of wrongs, not 
the punishment of misdeeds.”). 
65 See James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, ¶ 397, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507 & Add. 
1–4, (Mar. 15, June 15, Jul. 10, Jul. 18, Aug. 4, 2000) (relating difficulty drawing clear conclusions 
respecting collective countermeasures from a survey of State practice). 
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to prohibit collective countermeasures entirely. This view restricts resort to 
remedial measures to directly injured states and prohibits non-injured states from 
invoking responsibility or undertaking measures of redress. By contrast, a 
collectivist view broadens the notion of injured states, and therefore the availability 
of countermeasures.66 It envisions a hierarchy of international law norms wherein 
the nature and gravity of certain breaches justifies the involvement of states not 
directly injured and preempts the wrongfulness of collective countermeasures as to 
all involved in taking them.  
 
 Although these views have been showcased by scholars and considered by 
the ICJ and the ILC, neither has secured doctrinal consensus among states. 
Moreover, there is little state practice of collective countermeasures from which to 
draw definitive conclusions as to the primacy of one or the other. Nor have states 
spoken to the issue with sufficient frequency or specificity to do so. As will become 
apparent, the status of collective countermeasures therefore remains highly 
uncertain. In no domain is this more the case than with regard to cyber operations, 
where no publicly available state practice exists and only the French and Estonian 
expressions of opinio juris apply. 
 
A. The Bilateral View 
 
 As noted, through the early twentieth century internationally wrongful 
conduct was seen primarily as a matter between offending and victim states. Self-
help and other legal recourse accordingly were only available to states with direct 
legal interests in the breach in question.67 This bilateral approach was considered 
an important aspect of efforts to better organize international relations and temper 
international tension. The underlying theory was that by limiting the number of 
states involved in a dispute, the risk to “international peace and security” was 
minimized.68 The sense that a bilateralist approach would most effectively avoid 
and contain conflict was similarly reflected in other legal developments, including 
contemporaneous work on limiting the resort to force between states.69 
 
 However, the history of international relations in the twentieth century, 
including states’ resorts to countermeasures, did not always vindicate that 
 
66 In support of collective countermeasures, see generally Jeff Kosseff, Collective 
Countermeasures in Cyberspace, 10 Notre Dame J. Int'l Comp. L. 18 (2020). 
67 See Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57, 60–
61 (1989) (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 469–72 (1979)). 
68 Institut de Droit International, supra note 33, at 708, art. 1 (acknowledging the right of a State 
that has suffered harm to its prejudice as the result of unlawful conduct to derogate from 
international law). The term “international peace and security” is drawn from the UN Charter as 
indicative of the object and purposes underlying the norms governing relations between and among 
States. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
69 See generally OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL 
PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2018) (relating the development and legacy of the 
Kellogg-Briand Treaty outlawing war). See also League of Nations Covenant art. 12 (Apr. 28, 1919) 
(prohibiting war prior to resort to arbitration or judicial settlement). 
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approach.70 As a general matter, the bilateral view featured primarily in the context 
of formal dispute settlement mechanisms like litigation and arbitration.71 Two 
prominent cases at the ICJ reflected the bilateral view, but their results and the 
doctrine that emerged from them proved divisive. 
 
 In 1966, during widespread campaigns urging decolonization, the ICJ 
issued its controversial South West Africa Cases judgment (2d phase).72 The case 
merged separate claims by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa arising from 
the latter’s management of South West Africa (later Namibia) under a League of 
Nations mandate. The Applicants alleged that South Africa had violated the South 
West Africa Mandate by, inter alia, failing to promote the well-being of the people 
of South West Africa, establishing military bases, and through practices of 
apartheid.73 While the court reached a merits judgment, it did not fully adjudicate 
the parties’ claims because of a “question of the Applicants’ standing.”74 
 
 In filings, Ethiopia and Liberia had offered their status as former League 
members, as well as the humanitarian nature of the obligations of the South West 
Africa Mandate, as the legal bases for standing.75 The court rejected their argument 
because neither Ethiopia nor Liberia held an individual or collective legal interest 
in their claims. The court reasoned that neither state could differentiate itself in this 
respect from any other former member of the League of Nations.76 It relied heavily 
on the peculiar nature and original intent of the League’s post-First World War 
mandate system, rather than international law’s general remedial system,77 to hold 
that neither state was entitled to any pronouncement or declaration from an 
international tribunal such as the ICJ.78 The court similarly rejected the 
humanitarian character of the Mandate’s rules of conduct as a basis for the claims.79 
In terms prescient of forthcoming collectivist notions of international law, the court 
asserted “All States are interested—have an interest—in such matters. But the 
existence of an ‘interest’ does not of itself entail that this interest is specifically 
juridical in character.”80  
 
 
70 See, e.g., ELENA KATSELLI PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2010) (collecting historical examples of non-injured States’ resorts to countermeasures). 
71 See CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15–16 (1993) (noting the 
bilateralist conception of injury and standing at the Permanent Court of International Justice; citing 
Mavromattis Palestine Concessions, (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 
(Aug. 13)). 
72 See South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).  
73 See id. at 10–14. South Africa countered that its obligations under the Mandate had expired with 
the collapse of the League.  
74 See id. ¶ 4. 
75 See id. ¶¶ 5, 49. 
76 See id. ¶¶ 24–25. In fact, the ICJ determined the Mandate established no legal obligations between 
South Africa and individual members of the League.  
77 See id. ¶¶ 16, 19–21. 
78 See id. ¶ 48. 
79 See id. ¶ 49–51. 
80 See id. ¶ 50. 
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 The South West Africa Cases cast a momentary pall over emerging notions 
of collective remedial action under international law.81 The court’s resort to a purely 
bilateral understanding seemed to deny the larger international community an 
important tool for policing grave breaches of international law. It clearly articulated 
an international justiciability doctrine in litigation before international tribunals. 
Yet, the extent to which the South West Africa Cases judgment reflected the general 
scheme of collective remedial action outside the context of litigation, including 
collective countermeasures, was less apparent. 
 
 In 1986, the ICJ returned to the issue of responses by non-injured states to 
breaches of international law in the Paramilitary Activities case.82 As in its South 
West Africa Cases judgment, the court advanced a bilateral view of international 
law redress, this time reaching the merits of a non-injured state’s resort to self-help 
on behalf of injured states. In doing so, it produced what is often cited as a firm 
rejection of collective countermeasures. Closer examination counsels a more 
restrained characterization.  
 
 In Paramilitary Activities, the ICJ considered alleged U.S. violations of 
Nicaraguan sovereignty, as well as U.S. actions that allegedly breached the 
customary law prohibitions on coercive intervention and the use of force.83 
Although the U.S. did not participate fully in the case, in jurisdictional proceedings 
it argued that, if attributable to the United States, the alleged wrongful conduct was 
justified as an exercise of collective self-defense or collective countermeasures on 
behalf of Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, which, the U.S. argued, had been 
 
81 In 1970, the UN Security Council requested ICJ advice on the legal significance of the presence 
of South Africa in Namibia. See S.C. Res. 284 (July 29, 1970); At the conclusion of a mandate for 
South Africa’s presence in Namibia, the Security Council had itself previously condemned the 
former’s presence as illegal. S.C. Res 276 (Jan. 30, 1970); In its Namibia advisory opinion, the 
Court upheld the General Assembly’s revocation of South Africa’s mandate to oversee Namibia and 
also held enforceable the Security Council’s direction that all States, without respect to injury, deny 
legal effect to acts of South Africa in Namibia after revocation. Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding S.C. Res. 
276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 118–24 (June 21).  
82 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Paramilitary Activities]. 
83 See id. ¶¶ 15, 23; Although the UN Charter is the primary source of international obligations with 
respect to the use of force and self-defense, the Paramilitary Activities Court did not apply the 
Charter’s provisions as such. The U.S. consent to jurisdiction of the ICJ that partially formed the 
basis of the Court’s jurisdiction precluded resort to treaty law unless all parties to the treaty in 
question were parties to the litigation. Declaration by the President of the United States, 
International Court of Justice: United States Recognition of Compulsory Jurisdiction, 2, ¶ c. (Aug. 
26, 1946) https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-0140.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GBH2-6CL5]; The U.S. had also consented to the Court’s jurisdiction for matters 
related to a bilateral treaty with Nicaragua. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nicar.-
U.S., art. XXIV, Jan. 21, 1956, 367 U.N.T.S. 3; In accordance with the former, the Court limited its 
judgment to consideration of applicable customary international law. Paramilitary Activities, supra 
note 82, ¶182. 
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victims of Nicaragua’s wrongful uses of force.84 The case did not present the court 
with the difficulties of justiciability that prevented a merits ruling in the South West 
Africa Cases and, given the U.S. resort to remedies as a non-injured state, seemed 
a worthy opportunity for the ICJ to address collective countermeasures. 
 
 The court accepted Nicaragua’s arguments that the U.S. had used unlawful 
force, intervened in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, and violated its sovereignty.85 
However, it also held that Nicaragua had previously made unlawful armed 
incursions into Honduras and Costa Rica, and through armed rebels in El 
Salvador.86 That both parties had engaged in otherwise internationally wrongful 
conduct raised the question whether the wrongfulness of the former U.S. activities 
could be precluded as a matter of the law of state responsibility owing to the 
preceding wrongfulness of Nicaragua’s conduct.87  
 
 The court first addressed preclusion of U.S. wrongfulness under the doctrine 
of self-defense. It held that although Nicaraguan activities in neighboring states’ 
territories amounted to prima facie wrongful conduct, its activities did not rise to 
the level of armed attack, the customary international law threshold for resort to 
self-defense.88 Therefore, the United States could not invoke self-defense as an 
excuse for its use of force against Nicaragua.89 The court also noted that the state 
victims of Nicaragua’s activities, Honduras and Costa Rica, had not requested 
assistance from the United States as a means of self-defense.90 
 
 
84 See Paramilitary Activities, supra note 82, ¶ 24 (noting U.S. arguments in a counter-memorial to 
jurisdiction that “providing, upon request, proportionate and appropriate assistance to third States” 
was a matter not properly before the Court). 
85 See id. ¶ 80–81 (finding the United States laid mines in Nicaraguan ports and attacked oil facilities 
by air); id. ¶ 98 (finding the U.S. funded paramilitary activities by contra rebels against Nicaragua); 
id. ¶ 227 (concluding U.S. mining and attacks amounted to prohibited uses of force); id. ¶ 228 
(concluding U.S. arming and training of rebels conducting insurrection amounted to prohibited uses 
of force); id. ¶ 242 (concluding U.S. support to contra rebels in Nicaragua constituted “a clear breach 
of the principle of non-intervention”); id. ¶ 251 (concluding that U.S. assistance to the contras and 
direct attacks amounted to violations of territorial sovereignty). 
86 See id. ¶ 160 (finding Nicaragua delivered arms to opposition forces in El Salvador); id. ¶ 164 
(finding that Nicaragua conducted cross-border attacks into Honduras and Costa Rica). 
87 See id. ¶ 226 (resolving to evaluate preclusions of wrongfulness). The Court did not definitively 
evaluate Nicaragua’s supply of arms as unlawful but observed such conduct, “may well constitute 
a breach of the principle of the non-use of force and an intervention . . . .” Id. ¶ 247.  
88 See id. ¶ 246; id. ¶ 195, 211 (holding the armed attack threshold is applicable to exercises of 
collective self-defense); id. ¶ 230 (concluding Nicaragua’s delivery of arms to rebels in El Salvador 
did not amount to an armed attack). 
89 See id. ¶ 230. 
90 See id. ¶¶ 196, 199; The Court held, “[T]he Court finds that in customary international law . . . 
there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the 
State which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack.” Id. ¶ 199; Although El Salvador 
requested the U.S. assist in self-defense, the Court determined the request post-dated U.S. uses of 
force, in some cases by as much as three years. Id. ¶¶ 233, 236; Moreover, the Court concluded El 
Salvador had not suffered an armed attack giving rise to self-defense, also precluding resort to 
collective self-defense. Id. ¶ 230; The Court did not identify any requests for collective self-defense 
from either Honduras or Costa Rica. Id. ¶ 234. 
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 Having determined that the threshold and conditions for collective self-
defense had not been met, the court turned its attention to collective 
countermeasures as a potential justification for the U.S. activities.91 Addressing its 
uses of force, the court rejected countermeasures as a justification, observing that 
countermeasures are limited to peaceful means short of the use of force,92 a position 
that is now well-accepted with respect to countermeasures generally,93 including 
cyber countermeasures.94 Importantly, the court did not consider peaceful, but 
otherwise unlawful, U.S. measures, specifically the financing of rebel activities in 
violation of the prohibition of intervention and U.S violations of Nicaragua’s 
sovereignty. Nor did it dwell on the fact that the victims of Nicaragua’s wrongful 
acts, Honduras and Costa Rica, had not requested assistance in the form of 
collective countermeasures. But, as with respect to self-defense, the court held that 
collective countermeasures cannot be undertaken unilaterally by a non-injured 
state. The court stated: 
 
While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective 
self-defence, a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot, as 
the Court has already observed … produce any entitlement to take 
collective countermeasures involving the use of force. The acts of 
which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have been 
established and imputable to that State, could only have justified 
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had 
been the victim of these acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or 
Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-measures taken by a third 
 
91 See id. ¶¶ 210, 246.  
92 See id. ¶¶ 248, 249; The Court later reiterated the view that use of force is only justified in response 
to armed attack in the Oil Platforms case, over the notable objection of Judge Simma (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Simma, ¶¶ 12–13). Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 57 
(Nov. 6); Still, the Paramilitary Activities case includes a curious passage addressing collective 
countermeasures in the form of “intervention short of armed attack.” The Court observed, in what 
was clearly obiter dictum, that if a State suffered “acts of intervention possibly involving the use of 
force” but short of armed attack, a third State “might have been permitted to intervene” against the 
offending State “in the exercise of some right analogous to the right of collective self-defence.” 
Paramilitary Activities, supra note 82, ¶ 210. 
93 See Oil Platforms case, supra note 92. 
94 See, e.g., United States, Paul C. Ney, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Remarks at U.S. 
Cyber Command Legal Conference (March 2, 2020) 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-generalcounsel-
remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference [https://perma.cc/HVQ3-HYD6]; UNITED 
KINGDOM, WRIGHT, supra note 25; AUSTRALIA, CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 25, at 
2019 International Law Supplement, https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-
relations/international-cyber-engagement-
strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html [https://perma.cc/8SQ4-NQPC]; 
FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 3, ¶ 1.1.3; NETHERLANDS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFS., supra note 25, at 7; FINLAND, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., supra note 25, at 5; NEW 
ZEALAND, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. AND TRADE, supra note 7, ¶ 21. For an overview of the topic, 
see generally Gary Corn & Eric Jensen, The Use of Force and Cyber Countermeasures, 32 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 127 (2018).  
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State, the United States, and particularly could not justify 
intervention involving the use of force.95 
  
 Read in isolation, the passage stands as strong support for the bilateral 
approach. However, as is always the case with the aftermath of litigation, care must 
be exercised in extrapolating this observation from the facts of the case. That the 
U.S. responses to Nicaragua’s activities involved acts amounting to the use of force 
clearly weighed on the court’s evaluation of available justifications; indeed, it 
considered only the U.S. actions that involved the use of force. The court did not 
rule whether U.S. measures short of use of force, such as providing funding to rebel 
groups, would qualify as valid collective countermeasures. Moreover, that no 
victim state had clearly requested assistance in responding to Nicaragua must also 
have colored the court’s ruling.  
 
 The best reading of the judgment restricts the court’s observations on 
collective countermeasures to instances involving the use of force and lacking a 
request from a victim states; the case did not require the court to evaluate situations 
in which a non-injured state resorts to peaceful breaches in response to a clear 
request for assistance by means of countermeasures from an injured state against 
the responsible state. Therefore, it cannot be read as unequivocally rejecting 
peaceful countermeasures undertaken by a non-injured state, in support of an 
injured state and at the clear request of the latter.  
 
 While the work of the ICJ offers a measure of support for the bilateral view, 
it is important not to overstate the reach and import of these rulings for the purpose 
of evaluating collective countermeasures. In the South West Africa Cases judgment, 
the court expressed a strictly bilateral understanding of international obligations but 
did so only to evaluate the standing of states in international litigation. As such, it 
offers little guidance on states’ resort to measures of redress outside litigation. And 
while it is true that its Paramilitary Activities judgment rejected, on seeming 
bilateralist grounds, a state’s purported resort to collective countermeasures, the 
ruling addressed only that state’s forcible and unilateral measures. 
 
B. The Collectivist View  
  
 Beyond limiting the relevance of conclusions by international tribunals to 
the narrow context in which they arose, critics also regard strictly bilateralist 
approaches as an outdated account of the UN Charter’s collective system of 
international peace and security.96 The South West Africa Cases judgment, perhaps 
the purest embodiment of the bilateralist view, provoked an immediate counter-
movement by jurists who sought to better reflect and effectuate the collectivist 
international legal system. Characterizing select internationally wrongful acts as 
 
95 Paramilitary Activities, supra note 82, ¶ 249 (internal citation omitted). The Court has not offered 
a similarly broad or definitive statement on collective countermeasures since its Paramilitary 
Activities judgment. 
96 See generally, e.g., PROUKAKI, supra note 70. 
2021 / Collective Cyber Countermeasures? 195 
owed erga omnes, that is, to the entire international community, they sought to both 
elevate the stature of international law and to improve the prospects of its 
enforcement, including by means of self-help between states. Academics provided 
the earliest voices for the approach,97 but it found its most influential advocates 
among the judges of the ICJ. 
 
 In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ rejected claims against Spain that Belgium 
submitted on behalf of a group of its nationals who transferred control of a holding 
company incorporated and headquartered in Canada.98 The court rejected the claims 
because Belgium was not an injured state.99 On that matter alone, the legacy of the 
Barcelona Traction case might have been that of an unremarkable case involving 
failure to allege a cognizable claim.  
 
 Yet the case earned a prominent place in international law pedagogy and 
practice on the basis of a brief observation concerning the nature of claims between 
states. Immediately after concluding that Belgium had failed to advance cognizable 
claims, the court urged a distinction between obligations “arising vis-à-vis another 
State . . .” on one hand and obligations “of a State towards the international 
community as a whole . . . .” on the other.100 The latter, the Court contended, were 
obligations erga omnes, such that “all States can be held to have a legal interest in 
their protection.”101  
 
 The court’s observation was a striking exercise in dictum, for the case 
presented no erga omnes obligation; no party had alleged such obligations in its 
submissions.102 Moreover, the court neither provided citation to authority or a 
recognized source of international law to support its dictum, nor offered clues 
concerning the obligations it considered. It simply observed that “the importance 
of the rights involved” gave rise to their erga omnes status.103 
 
 Beyond its status as dictum, there are further reasons to treat the Barcelona 
Traction judgment with caution. First, as with the South West Africa Cases 
judgment, the court’s treatment was couched in terms of justiciability; it did not 
reach the question of collective countermeasures undertaken outside litigation. 
Second, since the Barcelona Traction decision, erga omnes norms have not 
featured significantly in the court’s judgments. State litigants have not provided the 
court with opportunities to develop the concept. Finally, the erga omnes concept 
remains notoriously ambiguous. There is no authoritative account of which specific 
 
97 See, e.g., MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 7–8 
(1997) (citing GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 459 (1957)). 
98 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 
3, 7 ¶ 2 (Feb. 5). 
99 See id. ¶ 3.  
100 See id. ¶ 33. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. ¶ 35. 
103 See id. ¶ 33. 
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international rules comprise the body of erga omnes norms, and the very operation 
of such norms is often the subject of confusion.104 Four decades after its dubious 
emergence, the notion of erga omnes remains nascent and highly subjective. All 
the same, the premise that some international norms transcend bilateral relations 
has proven an attractive compromise approach to decades of debate concerning 
collective countermeasures.105 
 
 In this regard, the ILC has played an important and state-sanctioned role.106 
Although the ILC included the subject of state responsibility in an initial (1949) list 
of subjects for codification,107 its work on collective countermeasures did not 
feature until much later.108 Inspired by the ICJ’s treatment of erga omnes norms in 
the Barcelona Traction case, as well as by the Commission’s own work on the 
separate but related subject of peremptory norms under the law of treaties,109 the 
ILC began to integrate notions of collectivist enforcement into its Articles on State 
Responsibility project beginning in the 1970’s. Reports issued under Special 
Rapporteur Robert Ago (who later sat on the ICJ for the Paramilitary Activities 
case) noted both the emergence of a hierarchy of international norms—including 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole—and a distinctly 
collectivist enforcement regime to match.110 Ago’s work on the subject eventually 
(and controversially) included a proposal to recognize so-called “international 
crimes” by states, as distinct from simple breaches or delicts of international law.111 
His work stopped short, however, of acknowledging countermeasures by a non-
 
104 For instance, see the discussion of the Bragozzi ICJ’s treatment of self-determination as an erga 
omnes norm in its Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Islands [Legal Consequences of the Separation 
of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 95 (Feb. 2019)] 
in Craig Eggert and Sarah Thin, Clarification and Conflation: Obligations Erga Omnes in the 
Chagos Opinion, EJIL: TALK! (May 21, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/clarification-and-
conflation-obligations-erga-omnes-in-the-chagos-opinion [https://perma.cc/B95R-DSVQ]. 
105 See, e.g., Przemysław Roguski, Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace – Lex Lata, 
Progressive Development or a Bad Idea?, in 20/20 VISION: THE NEXT DECADE 25 (T. Jančárková, 
L. Lindström, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky eds., 2020) (identifying that collective 
countermeasures are permissible, but only in the case of breaches of erga omnes rules). 
106 See UN Charter art. 13(1); G.A. Res. 36/39, Enlargement of the International Law Commission 
(Nov. 18, 1981).  
107 Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its First Session, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/13 & Corr. 1-
3, GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1949). 
108 Martin Dawidowicz has produced an excellent summary of the ILC’s iterative work on collective 
countermeasures. See MARTIN DAWIDOWICZ, THIRD-PARTY COUNTERMEASURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 72–110 (2017). 
109 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 53 (voiding treaties 
inconsistent with “peremptory norm[s] of general international law”). 
110 See Roberto Ago, Third Report on State Responsibility, Mar. 5, Apr. 7, Apr. 28 & May 18, 1971, 
210–11, ¶¶ 41–43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246 & Add.1–3, in 1971 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N Vol. II, pt. 1 
(noting emergence of a category of norms breach of which gives rise to responsibility to all States 
and need for a matching regime of responsibility); Roberto Ago, Fifth Report on State 
Responsibility, Mar. 22, Apr. 14 & May 4, 1976, 26–27, ¶¶ 80–83, in 1976 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 
Vol. II, pt. 1 (noting growing departures from the view that a single regime of responsibility applies 
to all breaches of international law). 
111 See Ago, Fifth Report, supra note 110, ¶ 153. 
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injured state, culminating instead with arguments in favor of assigning enforcement 
of international crimes to the United Nations.112 
 
 By the early 1980’s, newly appointed Special Rapporteur Willem 
Riphagen’s reports further evinced the Commission’s increasing frustration with a 
bilateral regime of responsibility and enforcement.113 The ILC considered 
proposals to give effect to third-party participation in the enforcement of 
community norms, especially a broadened scope to the notion of an “injured State” 
that would have included the international community in the case of Ago’s 
international crimes proposal.114  
 
 Building on Riphagen’s work, Special Rapporteur Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz 
proposed separate third-party schemes of countermeasures for violations of erga 
omnes partes (multilateral) norms and for international crimes.115 Both regimes 
required elaborate prior consultations of the United Nations and judicial bodies, 
including the ICJ.116 Yet neither found favor with states, which judged the schemes 
as unrealistic and so out of step with mainstream views of international law as to 
be revolutionary.117 Disheartened by negative reactions, Arangio-Ruiz reportedly 
resigned as Special Rapporteur. Nevertheless, a drafting committee continued to 
work on the subject, producing draft articles that recognized international crimes 
but included no specific enforcement regime, stripping the concept of all but 
rhetorical significance.118 
 
 The ILC appointed James Crawford as Special Rapporteur in 1997. 
Crawford quickly decided the 1996 Draft Articles’ concept of international crimes 
to be unworkable.119 In his final draft of the Articles, he dropped it entirely in favor 
of focusing on responses by third-party states to breaches of community norms.120 
 
112 See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, at 76 (quoting Roberto Ago, Eighth Report on State 
Responsibility, Jan. 24, Feb. 5 & June 15, 1979, ¶¶ 91–92, in 1979 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, Vol. II, 
pt. 1, 3, 43–44). 
113 See Willem Riphagen, Third Report on State Responsibility, Mar. 12, Mar. 30 & May 5, 1982, ¶ 
92, in 1982 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N Vol. II, pt. 1, 22, 36–37; see also DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, 
at 79–85 (describing evolutions of drafts leading to the 1996 Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States). 
114 Riphagen, supra note 34, at 3 (recognizing the authority of injured States, including “all other 
States” to resort to “reprisal”). 
115 See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, May 9, May 24 & May 29, 
1995, ¶ 140, UN Doc. A/CN.4/469 & Add.1–2, in Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, Vol. II, pt. 1, 47–49. 
116 See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, at 81–83. 
117 See id. at 83 (citing Rep. Int’l Comm’n, 47th sess, May 6-July 26, 1996, Topical Summary of 
Government Comments in the Sixth Committee, Addendum 24–27, ¶¶ 86–97, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/472/Add.1 (Jan. 10, 1996)). 
118 See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, at 84–86. 
119 See James Crawford, First Report on State Responsibility, Apr. 24, May 1, May 5, May 11, May 
26, Jul. 22, Jul. 24 & Aug. 12, 1998, 9, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/490 ¶ Add. 1–7 (judging the 
distinction between international crimes and delicts the “single most controversial element in the 
draft articles on State responsibility”). 
120 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, commentary to intro, commentary to arts. 41–
42. 
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As for collective countermeasures, Crawford proposed a draft article that afforded 
non-injured states the right to undertake countermeasures “at the request and on 
behalf of” an injured State, as well as independently with respect to serious 
breaches of peremptory norms.121  
 
 The UN Sixth Committee (Legal) and states could not reach a workable 
consensus on the draft. States opposed to the Crawford draft cited its destabilizing 
effects and the danger of pretextual resorts to countermeasures against weak states, 
while those that supported the draft underscored the need for cooperative self-help 
in light of the weakness of the UN collective security system.122 Supportive states 
further emphasized that an entitlement to resort to peaceful countermeasures might 
dissuade states from turning to more extreme and threatening forcible measures.123  
 
 Ultimately, Crawford brokered a compromise approach to collective 
remedial measures, including countermeasures, that is reflected in three important 
passages of the current ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The first two address 
the right of states to invoke the responsibility of an offending state for an 
internationally wrongful act. In addition to recognizing the right of an injured state 
to invoke responsibility for obligations owed to it individually,124 Article 42 
acknowledges the same right of an injured state with respect to obligations owed to 
“the international community as a whole,”125 a clear nod to the erga omnes concept. 
The ILC’s commentary to the Article indicates that invocation of responsibility 
entails the right to resort to the full regime of redress, including countermeasures 
against the offending State.126 
 
 The Articles address invocation of responsibility by a non-injured state 
separately in Article 48. Like an injured state, “any State other than an injured 
State” may invoke responsibility for breach of obligations “owed to the 
international community as a whole,” a further nod to the erga omnes concept.127 
However, unlike an injured state, a non-injured state may not, it seems, resort to all 
measures of redress. Article 48(2) appears to limit non-injured states to demanding 
the responsible state to cease and insisting that it make reparations to “the injured 
State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”128 Standing alone, Article 
48 seems to preclude non-injured states from resorting to any other means of 
redress, including countermeasures, against a responsible state. 
 
 
121 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, May 1–June 9, July 10–
Aug. 18, 2000, 70, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000) (addressing at Article 54, “Countermeasures by States 
other than the injured State”) [hereinafter Crawford, Rep. ILC 2000]. 
122 See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, at 100–06; Otto Spijkers, Bystander Obligations at the 
Domestic and International Level Compared, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 47, 74–77 (2014). 
123 See DAWIDOWICZ, supra note 108, at 102–06. 
124 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 42(a). 
125 See id. art. 42(b). 
126 See id. commentary to art. 42, ¶ 3. 
127 See id. art. 48(1)(b). 
128 See id. art. 48(2). 
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 Yet a third provision suggests otherwise. Located in the Articles’ chapter 
on countermeasures, Article 54 provides: 
 
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under 
article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, 
to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the 
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the 
beneficiaries of the obligation breached.129 
 
 The Article has been helpfully characterized as a “non-prejudice clause” or 
“saving clause.”130 The clearest reading is that Article 54 preserves the right of non-
injured states to resort to countermeasures on behalf, or in the interest, of an injured 
state in the face of Article 48’s otherwise preclusive language. The ILC’s 
commentary to the article appears to confirm this understanding with a brief survey 
of state practice that includes collective measures undertaken in support of injured 
states. The measures include not only lawful acts of retorsion like economic 
sanctions but also breaches of treaty obligations, such as a flight ban that constituted 
non-performance of bilateral aviation agreements.131 Such violations could only be 
lawful as countermeasures. Seemingly not content with the clear implications of 
Article 54 or with these examples of state practice, the ILC concludes its 
commentary with the following confusing, penultimate passage:  
 
As this review demonstrates, the current state of international law 
on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is 
uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number of 
States. At present, there appears to be no clearly recognized 
entitlement of States referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures 
in the collective interest.132  
 
 Evaluating the ILC’s work on collective countermeasures is thus 
challenging. The iterative work of the ILC on collective countermeasures displays 
a distinctly experimental character.133 At each stage, and under each rapporteur, the 
Commission’s work seemed less an effort to codify existing rules of custom than a 
drive to probe the edges of state tolerance for regulation and progressive 
development. The various drafts and reports swung widely and wildly between 
restrictive and permissive regimes for collective countermeasures. While 
 
129 Id. art. 54. 
130 Enrico Milano & Paolo Palchetti, Questioning the Development of International Law with 
Regard to Third-Party Countermeasures: Lessons from Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Beyond, 
QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. (June 30, 2016), http://www.qil-qdi.org/questioning-development-
international-law-regard-third-party-countermeasures-lessons-libya-syria-ukraine-beyond 
[https://perma.cc/92XW-4N6M]. 
131 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 88, commentary to art. 54, ¶¶ 3–4. 
132 Id. ¶ 6. 
133 See Koskenniemi, supra note 15, at 340 (noting the ILC’s work on countermeasures took it 
beyond “codification of the law of State responsibility to ‘constructing a system of multilateral 
public order’”) (quoting Crawford, Rep. ILC 2000, supra note 121, at 112). 
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Crawford’s final product reined in many of the aspirational aspects of the Articles 
with respect to third-party countermeasures, it still found consensus on the matter 
illusive. 
 
 In sum, the ICJ and ILC have accepted and implemented the bilateralist and 
collectivist approaches selectively and fitfully. The dim prospects for redress of 
grave international wrongs under the bilateralist approach seem to have dissuaded 
both institutions from fully embracing its formalism and rigor. Meanwhile, the 
collectivist approach’s precarious pedigree and persistent ambiguities have 
prevented it from serving as a descriptively accurate account of available state 
responses to wrongful conduct.  
 
 Ultimately, the fairest depiction of the legality of collective 
countermeasures is that the matter is unsettled, with no clear obstacle standing in 
the way of either view. Relating the process of their development and the debates 
surrounding the Articles on State Responsibility, Crawford observed, “[I]t could 
hardly be the case that countermeasures were limited to breaches of obligations of 
a bilateral character. Accordingly, the ILC agreed . . . [to] leave the resolution of 
the matter to further developments in international law and practice.”134 
 
IV. Collective Countermeasures in Cyberspace 
 
 Crawford’s observation, that resolution of the collective countermeasures 
issue is to be left “to further developments in international law and practice,”135 was 
prudent and prescient. He correctly judged, based on his experience and that of 
preceding special rapporteurs, that states had not achieved consensus on the legality 
of collective countermeasures. And he seems to have wisely anticipated that 
changes in the practices and character of international relations might later inform 
opinion.  
 
 The flipside of Crawford’s observation, of course, is that states now face 
hostile cyber operations of ever-growing frequency and severity without clearly 
settled international law on the important question of collective enforcement. The 
unsettled character of the law does not relieve them, however, of the practical need 
to craft effective responses to such operations. States that seek to operate within the 
 
134 James Crawford, Overview of Part Three of the Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 33, 
at 931, 939; see also David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
817, 828 (2002) (“To articulate a rule for collective countermeasures prematurely would run the risk 
of "'freez[ing]' an area of law still very much in the process of development." But to say nothing on 
the subject might have raised the (apparently) false impression that collective countermeasures were 
barred and that only "injured States," as defined in the articles, were eligible to impose them.'' The 
pragmatic compromise-and, indeed, the only possible political solution-was to defer debate to 
another day and to allow customary international lawmaking processes to elaborate any conditions 
on the use of collective countermeasures.”). Jeff Kosseff notes that Bederman had provided 
comments to the Commission on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in his capacity as Chair 
of the American Society of International Law's Panel on State Responsibility. Kosseff, supra note 
2, at 25. 
135 Crawford, supra note 134. 
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boundaries of international law must accordingly adopt a position on the 
permissibility of collective cyber countermeasures and any attendant requirements 
or restrictions.  
 
A. Interpreting the Law of Cyber Countermeasures 
 
 The customary international law framework for countermeasures almost 
certainly applies in the cyber context. No state has openly contested its 
applicability, and most states that have commented publicly on how international 
law governs cyber operations have included a statement confirming the availability 
of countermeasures.136 Whether there is a right to take collective countermeasures 
remains, as discussed, unresolved, with reasonable justification existing for both 
positions. But assuming for the sake of analysis that collective countermeasures are 
permissible, may a state justifiably take the position that collective cyber 
countermeasures are an available response option? 
 
 As a first step in addressing the matter, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the crystallization of a new customary international law norm and the interpretation 
of an existing one.137 The former requires widespread state practice (either 
engaging in or refraining from specified conduct) over time out of a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris).138  
 
 These dual requirements pose obstacles to the emergence of new customary 
rules for cyberspace. First, the qualifying state practice must be both extensive and 
uniform.139 Yet, most of the state activity in cyberspace takes place in a highly 
classified realm. Even extensive and uniform cyber operations mounted to 
terminate unlawful operations attributable to another state cannot qualify as state 
practice unless they are evident to other states. This is necessary to allow those 
states to either condemn the actions on legal grounds or offer expressions of support 
 
136 See statements cited, supra note 25. 
137 See Jean d’Aspremont, The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-Determination 
and Law-Ascertainment Distinguished, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (Andrea 
Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew Windsor eds., 2015). 
138 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 
3); see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 
71, 77 (Feb. 20). The Statute of the ICJ describes customary international law as “a general practice 
accepted as law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of 
Customary International Law, with Commentaries, U.N., Doc. A/73/10 (2018), 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_13_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N3Q-Z8RM]. 
139 See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 138, ¶ 74 (“Although the passage of only a short 
period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, 
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and 
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such 
a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”). 
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as to its legal basis.140 Second, there is little opinio juris on the matter of collective 
cyber countermeasures.141 The two most notable expressions thereof are those of 
France and Estonia. Not only do they constitute a collection of states that is too 
small to satisfy the density requirement, but the statements are contradictory. That 
being so, the issue of collective cyber countermeasures can only be addressed as 
one involving the interpretation of an injured state’s right (for the sake of analysis) 
to take collective countermeasures against a responsible state in order to compel it 
to desist in its unlawful conduct and/or provide reparations.  
 
 When states face a situation in which the content of a legal norm is unclear, 
it is appropriate for them to engage in auto-interpretation, which refers to the 
possibility of various parties to an international legal instrument adopting distinct 
yet equally valid understandings of the meaning of such an instrument.142 That 
international law anticipates auto-interpretation is best exemplified by the fact that 
state practice requires opinio juris before a new customary norm becomes 
crystallized. The requisite practice accompanied by opinio juris does not arrive in 
one fell swoop; it builds over time until sufficient density is achieved.143 Thus, if 
auto-interpretation were inappropriate per se in the international legal system, there 
would be no means for the crystallization dynamic to take place. 
 
 Auto-interpretation is even more apposite in an interpretive context in 
which the question is merely how to understand a customary rule that already exists 
but is ambiguous. In great part, the methodology by which customary law rules are 
interpreted is itself unsettled, certainly more so than with respect to treaties.144 Of 
course, as with crystallization, an interpretation may become binding on all states 
over time because a critical mass of state practice that is consistent with the 
 
140 See INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY 
(GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF 
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONFERENCE, LONDON 
15 (2000). 
141 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 138, at 139 (“It is not necessary to establish that all States 
have recognized (accepted as law) the alleged rule as a rule of customary international law; it is 
broad and representative acceptance, together with no or little objection, that is required.”). 
142 See Bin Cheng, How Should We Study International Law?, 13 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. 
AND AFF. 214, 220–21 (1994); Ingo Venzke, Authoritative Interpretation, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 15 (April 2018), 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e3528.013.3528/law-mpeipro-
e3528?rskey=9ACwle&result=3&prd=MPIL [https://perma.cc/FP37-MMC5]. See also the 
discussion, as well as the sources cited therein, in Michael Waibel, Demystifying the Art of 
Interpretation, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 571, 578, 583-84 (2011). 
143 The practice must be “general.” Statute of the ICJ, supra note 138, art. 38(1)(b). For a discussion 
of the requirement of both general practice and opinio juris, see generally Int’l Law Comm’n, supra 
note 138, Conclusions 2 and 8 and accompanying commentary. 
144 On interpretation of customary international law, see Stefan Talmon, Determining Customary 
International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 417 (2015); see also Panos Merkouris, Interpreting the Customary Rules on Interpretation, 
19 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 126 (2017); see generally THE THEORY, PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION 
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (Paros Merkouris, Jörg Kammerhoffer & Noora Arajärvi 
eds., forthcoming 2021).  
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interpretation, combined with opinio juris, eventually comes to exist.145 Until that 
occurs, states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation or even error. In much the same 
way a state may engage in auto-interpretation to conclude that countermeasures 
may be collective in nature, in so concluding a state may engage in further auto-
interpretation to adopt the position that collective cyber actions are an appropriate 
form of collective countermeasures.  
 
 Importantly, the discretion of states to engage in auto-interpretation is not 
unfettered. They must do so in “good faith,” a general principle of international 
law.146 To be in good faith, a state’s interpretation cannot be inconsistent with the 
underlying “object and purpose” of the rule in question,147 a concept found in the 
law of treaty interpretation,148 but the logic of which is no less applicable to 
interpreting extant customary international law rules. When dealing with a 
situation, especially one involving new technology, that states did not contemplate 
at the time the customary rule crystallized, the issue is whether its characteristics 
are such that the proposed interpretation is coherent in light of the rule’s underlying 
object and purpose.149 If so, the interpretation lies within the state’s margin of 
appreciation; it is reasonable. 
 
B. Object and Purpose in Context 
 
 In terms of object and purpose, countermeasures are a mechanism of self-
help in a decentralized international system, one that allows states to safeguard their 
own rights under international law in the face of other states’ unlawful conduct.150 
While they directly provide a remedy for injured states, countermeasures also 
reflect an implied presumption that unlawful behavior is by nature destabilizing for 
the broader international community. Thus, like much of public international law, 
they function to maintain stability in the international system by providing a means 
to ensure that mutually beneficial community norms are maintained. To survive as 
 
145 See Continental Shelf, supra note 138, ¶ 27; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
supra note 26, ¶ 64. 
146 See Venzke, supra note 142, ¶ 15; Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 46 
(Dec. 20) (“One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, 
whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.”). 
147 In the treaty context, see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 31(1). 
On object and purpose in the treaty context, see MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 427–28 (2009); see also Jan Klabbers, Treaties, 
Object and Purpose, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated 
Dec. 2006), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1681?rskey=fnvOHS&result=1&prd=OPIL [https://perma.cc/A5B9-CNGT]. 
148 On the comparison between interpretation of customary and treaty rules, see Marina Fortuna, 
Different Strings of the Same Harp Interpretation of Customary International Law versus 
Identification of Custom and Treaty Interpretation, in THE THEORY, PRACTICE AND 
INTERPRETATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 144. 
149 See, e.g., the application of international humanitarian law to nuclear weapons, and rejection of 
the argument that pre-existing law does not apply to new weapons, by the ICJ in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, ¶ 86. 
150 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, commentary to Part Three, ch. II, ¶ 1.  
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a viable interpretation, the notion of collective cyber countermeasures must not 
contradict this objective.  
 
 In this regard, cyberspace is an alluring domain for operations against other 
states. Cyber operations eliminate many of the obstacles that geography poses to 
traditional hostile activities. To take a simple example, consider election meddling, 
which before the advent of cyber operations generally involved covert operations 
occurring, at least in part, within territory of the target state.151 Cyber capabilities 
now enable such operations, many of which are unlawful, to be mounted entirely 
from within the offending state by means that are readily available to most states, 
either directly or through the use of non-state proxy actors.152  
 
 As this example illustrates, states are leveraging the unique characteristics 
of cyberspace to engage in operations that are cheap, effective, and relatively risk 
free. The result has been a deluge of hostile cyber operations. By one estimate, 
thirty-four countries are suspected of conducting hostile cyber operations since 
2005 (77% of them by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia).153 Many of those 
operations breached international law rules such as respect for the sovereignty of 
other states,154 or the prohibition on coercive intervention into others’ internal 
affairs,155 thereby opening the door to countermeasures by injured states. 
 
 The flip side of this reality is that the capability to conduct effective cyber 
countermeasures in the face of unlawful cyber operations is limited to a relatively 
small number of states.156 In the first place, many states lack the requisite 
institutional offensive cyber capability to successfully mount operations beyond 
their borders, especially against responsible states that are themselves highly 
capable and well-defended in cyberspace. And even if they wield such capabilities 
in the abstract, injured states wanting to engage in a countermeasure may be unable 
to execute a particular countermeasure because they are unaware of a vulnerability 
 
151 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual" Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the 
Grey Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 30, 38 (2018). 
152 See Michael N. Schmitt, Foreign Cyber Interference in Elections: An International Law Primer, 
Parts I, II, III, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 16 & 19, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/mschmitt/ 
[https://perma.cc/83QL-JXEM]. 
153 See Cyber Operations Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/cyber-
operations/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/M56V-QQCT]. 
154 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, rr. 1-5; see also Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, 
Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 1639 (2017). 
155 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, r. 66. 
156 In 2017, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper estimated that over 30 States were 
developing offensive cyber capabilities. See Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong. 13 (2017) (statement of James R. Clapper, 
Director of National Intelligence), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
115shrg33940/html/CHRG-115shrg33940.htm [https://perma.cc/LU6M-K4HD]; While that 
number has surely grown, even some of these countries lack a robust capability. Julia Voo, Irfan 
Hemani, Simon Jones, Winnona DeSombre, Dan Cassidy & Anina Schwarzenbach, National Cyber 
Power Index 2020, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.: BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFFS., (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/national-cyber-power-index-2020 
[https://perma.cc/8QGH-SL9R]. 
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in the system to be targeted, do not have access to that system, or lack a specific 
capability necessary to leverage the vulnerability in question.  
 
 Of course, since countermeasures need not be in-kind, injured states without 
the requisite cyber wherewithal would be entitled to respond with non-cyber 
countermeasures, as in closing its territorial sea to vessels of the responsible state 
transiting in innocent passage.157 But cyber responses are the most operationally 
likely countermeasures to cyber wrongful acts; and in the case of either a cyber or 
non-cyber countermeasure, a weak state acting alone may be unable to muster 
sufficient influence to induce a powerful responsible state to cease its wrongful 
conduct.  
 
 In sum, the interpretive context with respect to collective cyber 
countermeasures is one in which states are increasingly targeted in cyberspace, 
while their ability to unilaterally respond by cyber means is not consistent with that 
precarious reality. To deprive these states an opportunity to look to other states for 
assistance, in responding to unlawful cyber operations that do not rise to the level 
of an “armed attack” permitting collective defense, would in many cases prevent 
them from terminating the hostile operations or otherwise compelling the 
responsible state to desist.158 It is arguably a situation that will encourage a cyber 
arms race as states try to acquire offensive cyber and non-cyber capabilities that 
will empower them to respond unilaterally.159 Doing so would run counter to the 
object and purpose of countermeasures. 
 
C. Bilateralist and Collectivist Approaches Assessed 
 
 This is not to say that a bilateralist approach barring collective cyber 
countermeasures, one France has adopted, is without justification. 
Countermeasures are an exceptional self-help tool in the sense that they allow for 
what would otherwise be unlawful conduct. The fact that countermeasures are 
subject to significant limitations further augurs against a broad interpretation of the 
right. Moreover, bilateralists would assert, and reasonably so, that the greater the 
number of states involved in a contentious situation, the more likely a destabilizing 
breach of international peace and security is to occur, especially in light of the 
technical challenges of attribution and the consequent risk of misattribution. They 
 
157 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, at 128; Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, 
at 129. 
158 In the face of a “grave and imminent peril” to an “essential interest,” a State may engage in 
otherwise unlawful actions to put an end to the peril even if it breaches obligations owed to non-
responsible States. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 25. However, the harm 
being suffered must be very serious and it is unclear whether other States may assist the operations 
of the State being harmed or engage in cyber operations on its behalf pursuant to the so-called “plea 
of necessity.” TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, r. 26. 
159 On the correlation between cyber threats and the acquisition of cyber capabilities, see Anthony 
Craig, Understanding the Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.: NET 
POL. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/understanding-proliferation-cyber-capabilities 
[https://perma.cc/K9NX-UQXK]. 
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would argue that it is only when the harm the injured state faces is so severe, as to 
amount to a cyber armed attack under the law of self-defense,160 that the risk of 
exacerbating a situation through the involvement of non-injured states is justified. 
For the bilateralist, a prohibition of collective cyber countermeasures and a 
collective right to use cyber and kinetic measures in the face of an armed attack 
pursuant to the law of self-defense are not inconsistent; they simply reflect different 
response points along a risk continuum.  
 
 A countervailing collectivist response would be that unremedied 
internationally wrongful behavior represents the greater threat to individual states, 
the integrity of the international legal system, and broader international peace and 
security than the risk of escalation. The very fact that the right to countermeasures 
contemplates unlawful behavior by states signifies the importance of avoiding 
situations in which an injured state is without recourse to compel a responsible state 
to desist in its unlawful conduct. Equally, it signals the significance that the 
international community attributes to making the injured state whole by offering a 
means of enforcing the obligation to provide reparations. And, after all, the 
authenticity of the threat that the responsible state poses to the injured state and 
broader stability has already been established by the willingness of the former to 
act in a destabilizing and unlawful manner in the first place. 
 
 For the collectivists, therefore, international law must be interpreted in a 
manner that affords states a practical remedy when facing clearly unlawful conduct. 
In the cyber context, that remedy is likely available to many states only through 
collaboration with others. Moreover, international peace and security is enhanced, 
in their view, by effective, and therefore deterrent, action; inaction only serves to 
encourage further wrongful behavior.  
 
 For collectivists, all states, including non-injured states, have an interest in 
preventing and deterring unlawful state behavior by acting decisively to maintain 
the rule of law among members of the global community. In no domain is this truer 
than in cyberspace, where an unlawful cyber operation against one state can 
generate dire consequences in third-party states but not, standing alone, breach a 
legal obligation owed those states, as was the case with Russia’s 2017 NotPetya 
operations that spread globally from Ukraine.161 If collective countermeasures are 
impermissible, the affected states would be limited to responding through acts of 
retorsion in these situations. Collective countermeasures provide states, willing and 
able to assist a victim state, with effective response options and also mitigate 
erosion of respect for international law primary rules more generally. 
 
160 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, r. 71. 
161 See Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in 
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-
russia-code-crashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/VG9E-4UXK]. The mere fact that a State is 
affected by an unlawful cyber operation against another State does not qualify it as an “injured State” 
such that countermeasures become available in its own right. To so qualify, the consequences of the 
cyber operation for the affected State must independently breach an obligation it is owed by the 
State to which the operation is question is attributable. 
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 A limitation on the collective conduct of countermeasures could also 
encourage states to skew interpretation of international law so as not to leave 
themselves without viable response options. For instance, Professors Gary Corn 
and Eric Jensen have perceptively observed:  
 
[I]n a world of significant technological disparity, the lack of 
collective cyber options may have the perverse effect of 
incentivizing victim states to overclassify an incident in an attempt 
to allow the use of kinetic tools to resolve the conflict. States that 
are not cyber capable, or that are less cyber capable than the 
responsible state, may not feel they have adequate means to 
effectively apply nonkinetic responses that comply with all the 
countermeasure requirements. In those cases, it is possible that 
victim states will define the responsible state’s unlawful act as an 
armed attack in order to expand possible responses into an area 
where the victim state’s capability is relatively more robust.162 
 
And if collective defense is the purported legal basis for the response, other states, 
acting in collective defense, may resort to cyber or non-cyber operations at the use 
of force level in response to the hostile operation. Thus, characterizing the initiating 
hostile cyber operation as an armed attack, in order to compensate for the state’s 
inability to respond unilaterally by cyber means, would run the risk of escalation 
both in terms of the nature of the response and its scope.  
 
 This dynamic could easily cut the other way. It is only necessary to qualify 
a response as a countermeasure if it would otherwise be unlawful, for a 
countermeasure may only be taken in response to an internationally wrongful act. 
Facing unlawful cyber operations from another state, the injured and assisting states 
might claim that their collective response is retorsion, that it does not rise to the 
level of a breach of primary rules like sovereignty or intervention. Such a 
characterization would permit them to respond collectively, but in doing so, they 
would lose the option of characterizing future hostile cyber operations of the same 




 To date, only two states have taken a public stand on the issue of collective 
cyber countermeasures. France expectedly adopts a bilateralist approach, for it 
possesses a substantial cyber capability to which it may resort if other states subject 
 
162 Corn & Jensen, supra note 94, at 130. 
163 See, e.g., the discussion of options available to the United Kingdom in the face of hostile Russian 
cyber operations following its rejection of sovereignty as a rule of international law. Michael N. 
Schmitt & Jeffrey Biller, Un-caging the Bear? A Case Study in Cyber Opinio Juris and Unintended 
Consequences, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/un-caging-the-bear-a-case-
study-in-cyber-opinio-juris-and-unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/6PP8-HGH6].  
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it to internationally wrongful cyber operations.164 Estonia’s adoption of the 
collectivist approach was equally predictable given that it was the target of what is 
perhaps the watershed wakeup call with respect to hostile cyber operations in 
2007.165 Although Estonia punches well above its weight in cyber matters, it does 
not field a robust institutional capability to conduct offensive cyber operations, and 
its relations with neighboring Russia, which has demonstrated a willingness to 
engage in unlawful cyber operations, is fraught.166 Should Estonia respond with 
countermeasures to Russian operations, it would likely look to its primary security 
guarantor, NATO, or to close allies such as the United States or United Kingdom, 
for assistance.167 And as Estonian President Kaljulaid pointed out, there is 
precedent for collective responses consistent with international law: “International 
security and the rules-based international order have long benefitted from collective 
efforts to stop the violations. We have seen this practice in the form of collective 
self-defence against armed attacks. For malicious cyber operations, we are starting 
to see this in collective diplomatic measures….”168  
 
 In our estimation, if there is a trend to discern between the two camps, states 
appear to view collaborative and cooperative responses to instability caused by 
hostile cyber measures as essential. In fact, the approaches that a number of 
international organizations have taken reflect the tendency to treat hostile cyber 
operations as a shared concern. For instance, the European Union has adopted the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, which allows for coordinated sanctions across the 
organization’s member states in the face of certain hostile cyber activities 
emanating at least in part from outside the European space.169 NATO, consisting of 
 
164 See FRANCE, MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, LA CYBERDÉFENSE (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail/enjeux2/la-cyberdefense/la-cyberdefense/presentation (Fr.). 
French strategy in this regard is set forth in, POLITIQUE MINISTÉRIELLE DE LUTTE INFORMATIQUE 
DÉFENSIVE, 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/557388/9657794/Lutte%20informatique%20d%C
3%A9fensive%20%28LID%29.PDF (Fr.) (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UC8C-
6FD4]. 
165 See ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 14–34 (2010); see also Rain Ottis, Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks Against 
Estonia from the Information Warfare Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH EUROPEAN 
CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 163 (Dan Remenyi ed., 2008), 
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ottis2008_AnalysisOf2007FromTheInformationWarfarePersp
ective.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5FJ-37YK]. 
166 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA: BACKGROUND AND U.S.-BALTIC 
RELATIONS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46139.pdf. 
167 See generally ESTONIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF ESTONIA 
(2017), 
https://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_conce
pt_2017.pdf (Est.) [https://perma.cc/L34G-PXPJ]. 
168 See Kaljulaid, supra note 2. 
169 See Samuele De Tomas Colatin, Si vis Cyber Pacem, para Sanctiones: the EU Cyber Diplomacy 
Toolbox in Action, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE [CCDCOE], 
https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/si-vis-cyber-pacem-para-sanctiones-the-eu-cyber-diplomacy-
toolbox-in-action/. 
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30 nations, has now issued cyber doctrine,170 and many international governmental 
organizations such as the Organization of American States, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
are working to craft collaborative mechanisms and procedures for responding to 
hostile cyber operations.171  
 
 Similarly, in a 2015 report that the UN General Assembly endorsed, the UN 
Group of Governmental Experts on information and communications technology 
recommended that states comply with eleven “voluntary, non-binding norms, rules 
or principles of responsible behaviour of States” to reduce risks to international 
peace, security, and stability.172 The first provides that “[c]onsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations, including to maintain international peace and 
security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase 
stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are 
acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and 
security.”173 Others urge states to “consider how best to cooperate to exchange 
information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and 
implement other cooperative measures to address such threats,” and “respond to 
appropriate requests for assistance by another State whose critical infrastructure is 
subject to malicious ICT acts.”174 
 
 Cooperative and collaborative approaches to international security also 
infuse the cyber strategies of key states. Taking the United States as an example, 
its 2019 Cyber Strategy explains how the United States will “preserve peace and 
security by strengthening the United States’ ability — in concert with allies and 
partners — to deter and if necessary punish those who use cyber tools for malicious 
purposes.”175 One of the measures to achieve that objective is to “strengthen the 
capacity and interoperability of those allies and partners to improve our ability to 
optimize our combined skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives against 
shared threats. Partners can also help detect, deter, and defeat those shared threats 
in cyberspace.”176  
 




171 See CCDCOE, Organisations: Overview of the Cyber Security Posture of Selected International 
Organisations, https://ccdcoe.org/organisations/ [https://perma.cc/3UVD-C7SQ] (last visited Feb. 
17, 2021). 
172 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 
2015) [hereinafter Group of Governmental Experts]; G.A. Res. 70/237, Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (Dec. 30, 2015) 
(endorsing the GGE report).  
173 Group of Governmental Experts, supra note 172, ¶ 13(a). 
174 Id. ¶¶ 13(d), (h). 
175 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (Sept. 2018) (emphasis 
added). 
176 See id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
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 The Department of Defense’s (DOD) subordinate cyber strategy echoes this 
approach. According to the unclassified summary, the United States will,  
 
Persistently contest malicious cyber activity in day-to-day 
competition: The Department will counter cyber campaigns 
threatening U.S. military advantage by defending forward to 
intercept and halt cyber threats and by strengthening the 
cybersecurity of systems and networks that support DoD missions. 
This includes working with the private sector and our foreign allies 
and partners to contest cyber activity that could threaten Joint Force 
missions and to counter the exfiltration of sensitive DoD 
information.177 
 
The Defense Department will also, “[o]perationalize international 
partnerships: Many of the United States’ allies and partners possess advanced cyber 
capabilities that complement our own. The Department will work to strengthen the 
capacity of these allies and partners and increase DoD’s ability to leverage its 
partners’ unique skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives.”178  
 
The operationalization of these cooperative cyberspace strategies by U.S. 
Cyber Command is reflected in its published “vision”: 
 
We will prepare, operate, and collaborate with combatant 
commands, services, departments, allies, and industry to 




The Command makes no apologies for defending US interests as 
directed by the President through the Secretary of Defense in a 
domain already militarized by our adversaries. To the maximum 
extent possible, we will operate in concert with allies and coalition 
partners.179 
 
“Collaborative” and “cooperative” actions are not necessarily “collective,” 
which in the legal sense refers to taking action based upon the right of another state 
to do so under international law. However, a commitment to collaboration and 
 
177 DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY, CYBER STRATEGY 4 (2018), 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-
1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/7CZD-4JXN] (emphasis 
added). 
178 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
179 U.S. CYBER COMMAND, ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY: COMMAND VISION 
FOR U.S. CYBER COMMAND 7, 10 (2018) 
https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7RM3-TF3S] (emphasis added). 
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cooperation in cyberspace represents clear acknowledgement of the fact that the 
nature of cyberspace is particularly susceptible to seeing threats as shared and 
meriting responses that draw on more than the resources of a single directly affected 
state.  
 
 This perception is also apparent in the general approach that states take to 
cyber countermeasures, which reflects a sense that cyber operations represent a 
unique threat, the characteristics of which must be considered in interpreting the 
legal content of the right to take countermeasures. With the sole exception of 
France, those that have spoken to the matter tend to resist strictly applying the 
limitations and requirements on countermeasures that the Articles on State 
Responsibility reflect. For instance, one important state participant in the so-called 
“Hague Process,” which brought states and intergovernmental organizations 
together to consider near final drafts of Tallinn Manual 2.0, was unwilling to accept 
the limitation in the Articles on the right to take countermeasures to unlawful cyber 
operations conducted by or attributable to states.180 It argued that countermeasures 
should also be available to respond to qualifying non-state actor cyber operations, 
even when not attributable to a state.181 Similarly, a number of states have expressed 
concern regarding the ILC’s requirement to provide notice to the responsible state 
of an intent to take countermeasures.182 Although the ILC itself acknowledged the 
possibility of “urgent countermeasures,”183 key states have emphasized that in a 
cyber context the notice requirement must be tempered by the urgency of the 
situation and the importance of ensuring that their capabilities remain secret.184 
These examples illustrate that states generally want countermeasures to be available 
as a response option against unlawful cyber operations, and that the characteristics 
of cyberspace merit flexibility in interpreting the law of countermeasures. This 
attitude augurs towards growing state acceptance of collective cyber 
countermeasures over time.  
 
 Finally, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts considered the issue of collective 
cyber countermeasures but could not come to a consensus. A number of them felt 
it appropriate to interpret the customary law rule on countermeasures as permitting 
collective cyber countermeasures so long as they are conducted in response to the 
injured state’s request. In part, they looked to the examples of state practice cited 
 
180 See Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law of Cyber Operations: What 
It Is and Isn’t, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37559/tallinn-manual-
2-0-international-law-cyber-operations/ [https://perma.cc/X9QH-WKHP]; Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 2(a).  
181 As the meetings were held according to Chatham House Rules, the state may not be named. 
However, the experts worked with representatives of that state to correctly capture its view. See 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, at 113.  
182 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, art. 52. 
183 See id. art. 52(2), commentary accompanying art. 52, ¶¶ (1), (6). 
184 For discussion on France, see MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, supra note 3, at 8; on the Netherlands, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS., supra note 25, at 7; Submission of the United States to the 2014-2015 
GGE, supra note 25, at 739; on the United Kingdom, Wright, supra note 25; on Israel, Schondorf, 
supra note 25; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, at 120. 
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in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility commentary as support.185 A majority 
of the experts, however, treated them as unlawful on both the basis of the 
Paramilitary Activities text cited above and the fact that the ILC commentary styled 
the aforementioned practice as “sparse and involv[ing] a limited number of 
states.”186  
 
 Interestingly, the experts added a further twist to the challenge of 
understanding collective cyber countermeasures by distinguishing cyber 
countermeasures taken on behalf of an injured state from those actions that support 
cyber countermeasures by the injured state. For example, the Paramilitary 
Activities case involved the circumstances of the former, when the United States 
undertook what it claimed were countermeasures against Nicaragua on behalf of, 
but not involving, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.187 As a simple example 
of the latter, consider a case in which an injured state fields cyber capability but 
must turn to another state to identify vulnerabilities in the systems that it intends to 
target; but for knowledge of those vulnerabilities, the injured state could not 
conduct its cyber countermeasure. Three views emerged from the experts.188  
 
 By the first, conducting a countermeasure and providing the assistance 
necessary for an injured state to do so are indistinguishable. In both cases, a non-
injured state is taking action that will lead to breach of a legal obligation owed the 
responsible state, with no basis for precluding wrongfulness vis-à-vis the state 
providing the assistance. If the non-injured state conducts the countermeasure, it 
will be responsible for the consequences of the operation, while if it assists, it will 
be responsible for that assistance pursuant to the customary rule reflected in Article 
16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.189 Second, some of the experts took the 
position that assistance is lawful unless the assistance itself would breach a legal 
obligation that the non-injured state owed to the responsible state. This would be 
the case, for example, if the non-injured state were inside the responsible state’s 
system and allowed the injured state to use that access to conduct its 
countermeasure. By contrast, merely providing generalized cyber training to the 
injured state’s personnel would violate no obligation owed by the non-injured state 
and therefore would be permissible. A third group of experts, which also included 
those who supported collective cyber countermeasures altogether, were of the view 
that conducting an operation must be distinguished from merely assisting in a cyber 
 
185 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, at 132 (citing Articles on State Responsibility, supra 
note 8, arts. 54(3), (4)).  
186 Id., citing Paramilitary Activities, supra note 82, ¶ 249 and Articles on State Responsibility, 
supra note 8, commentary art. 54, ¶ 6. 
187 See Paramilitary Activities, supra note 82, ¶ 210. 
188 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 48, at 132. 
189 See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 8, arts. 4, 16 (“A State which aids or assists 
another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.”). 
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operation, and that the latter is acceptable so long as the operation complies with 
all the requirements of, and limitations on, countermeasures.  
 
 Finally, it is important to emphasize that if the response to the responsible 
state’s unlawful operation does not constitute an internationally wrongful act, there 
is no need to preclude wrongfulness, and states may act collectively. As an 
example, states may contribute to the activities of entities such as the NATO Rapid 
Reaction teams190 and the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team191 as 
long as their actions do not need to qualify as countermeasures under the law of 
state responsibility because they otherwise would be unlawful. 
 
V. Concluding Thoughts 
 
 Countermeasures are clearly available under international law. But whether 
states may collectively conduct those countermeasures remains unsettled. While 
both the bilateralist and collectivist interpretations of the rule are reasonable, some 
of the common justifications underlying the argument against collective 
countermeasures, such as reliance upon the text of the Paramilitary Activities 
judgment, do not hold up to close scrutiny.  
 
 Assuming for the sake of analysis that collective countermeasures are 
permissible, the further question whether collective cyber countermeasures merit 
different treatment remains. Again, both sides of the debate may proffer cogent 
arguments. Even if engaging in cyber countermeasures on behalf of another state is 
unlawful, there is a plausible argument that merely providing assistance to that 
state’s own countermeasures would, in some cases, be permissible.  
 
 Our view is that collective cyber countermeasures on behalf of injured 
states, and by extension support to countermeasures of the injured state, are lawful. 
We have illustrated that no clear prohibition on collective countermeasures has 
crystallized to unequivocally preclude a state position, such as the one Estonia took. 
Instead, the broad vector of international law has been in the direction of the 
collectivist approach since the last century; there is no reason to suspect that it will 
change course significantly. Moreover, the unique nature of cyberspace suggests a 
need for greater tolerance of countermeasures. It appears that states are generally 
in accord with this premise. Finally, the object and purpose of the rule of 
countermeasures, when considered in the cyber context, supports an interpretation 
of countermeasures that allows them to be mounted collectively.  
 
 Ultimately, while others reasonably may disagree that this is the sounder 
approach to the matter, we can say with confidence that states may exercise their 
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discretion to interpret the international law governing countermeasures as allowing 
for collective countermeasures – and to do so in good faith. 
